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CONSIDERING "CLAIMS CRISIS" CLAIMS CLEARLY
ARTHUR BEST*
Introduction. Critics of lawyers and tort law argue that a "claims cri-
sis" is undermining the nation's competitiveness, and that legal doc-
trines favor plaintiffs by encouraging insignificant claims and directing
too much compensation to all types of claims.' Proponents of that view-
point might be surprised that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' deci-
sions in 1991 showed evenhanded treatment of important federal torts
issues concerning the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")2 and proce-
dural and evidentiary principles, and concerning state law torts issues
raised in diversity cases. While the decisions of one circuit may not rep-
resent national trends and while a single year's work may not wholly
demonstrate the court's direction, a qualitative assessment of the deci-
sions is possible: they contradict the allegation that current tort litiga-
tion routinely favors plaintiffs.
General Description of Decisions. Several of the Tenth Circuit's FTCA
decisions are consistent with a restrictive trend that broadens the gov-
ernment's immunity under the discretionary functions exception. One
decision, however, exposed the United States to liability for the actions
of an alleged "independent" contractor at a public hospital.3 Applying
federal procedural doctrines, the court found that a $25 million punitive
damages award in a products liability case was excessive, but not based
on prejudice, and it reduced the amount by half rather than ordering a
new trial. Applying the Federal Rules of Evidence in several instances,
the court held that trial judges improperly excluded testimony by plain-
tiffs' experts.
Clarifying or applying state law, the court of appeals held that Indi-
ana's statute of repose for product liability cases does not violate the
United States Constitution, refusing to invalidate a pro-defendant legis-
lative choice. Another decision that contradicts the alleged plaintiff-ori-
ented trend in tort law held that, even after the adoption of comparative
fault, Wyoming's application of the rescue doctrine continues to include
an absolute requirement of a reasonable belief by the plaintiff that res-
cue was needed.
In decisions favoring plaintiffs, the court of appeals held that
Oklahoma and Kansas doctrines allow recovery in products liability
cases where the plaintiff's evidence of the defendant's noncompliance
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Denver College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences (1988);
Studies cited in American Law Institute, Reporters' Study "Enterprise Liability for Per-
sonal Injury," 1 A.L.I. Reporters' Study 4 (1991).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1988).
3. Bird v. United States, 949 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1991).
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with the relevant standard is only circumstantial, that Colorado's statute
of limitations for personal injuries includes the anniversary date of the
injury, and that Colorado precedents currently permit punitive damages
for negligence in the context of breach of contract.
Federal Tort Claims Act Decisions. In three decisions, the court of ap-
peals applied the "discretionary function exception" of the FTCA, re-
lieving the United States of liability for claims "based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government .... -4 The cases are Zumwalt v. United States,5 involving a
hiker's injury at a national monument and a claim that a trail was marked
inadequately; Johnson v. United States,6 involving a climber's death in a
national park and claims that recreational climbing was inadequately
regulated and that a rescue effort should have been started sooner and
accomplished better; and Redmon v. United States,7 involving a pilot's
death in a plane crash and claims that the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion ("FAA") negligently certified the pilot and negligently failed to be-
gin enforcement proceedings against him.
In analyzing these cases, the court of appeals relied on Berkovitz v.
United States.8 Berkovitz requires a two-step analysis. First, the court
must decide whether the challenged conduct is a matter of choice for the
employee or was specifically prescribed by a statute, regulation or
policy:
[T]he discretionary function exception will not apply when a
federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a
course of action for an employee to follow. In this event, the
employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.
And if the employee's conduct cannot appropriately be the
product of judgment or choice, then there is no discretion in
the conduct for the discretionary function exception to
protect. 9
Second, where challenged conduct involves an element of judg-
ment: a court must determine whether that judgment is the kind that the
discretionary function exception was designed to shield.... The excep-
tion, properly construed, therefore protects only governmental actions
and decisions based on considerations of public policy.' 0
A more recent Supreme Court decision, United States v. Gaubert,l
makes it clear that when government policy found in a statute, regula-
tion or agency guidelines allows an employee to exercise discretion, "it
must be presumed that the agent's acts are grounded in policy when
4. 28 U.C.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
5. 928 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1991).
6. 949 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1991).
7. 934 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1991).
8. 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
9. Id. at 536.
10. Id. at 536-37.
11. 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991).
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exercising that discretion. ' ' 2 Gaubert stated:
For a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it must allege
facts which would support a finding that the challenged actions
are not the kind of conduct that can be said to be grounded in
the policy of the regulatory regime. The focus of the inquiry is
not on the agent's subjective intent in exercising the discretion
conferred by statute or regulation, but on the nature of the ac-
tions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy
analysis. 13
In Zumwalt, the plaintiff was injured at Pinnacles National Monu-
ment, while hiking with his family on a trail identified in a Parks Service
pamphlet. Markers along the trail correspond to points of scenic inter-
est. The plaintiff became confused as to the trail's direction and walked
a few steps to his right. He then slipped on loose gravel, slid down an
incline, fell through the roof of a cave and landed on the cave floor suf-
fering severe and permanent injuries. He sought damages claiming that
the government had been negligent in its operation of the National
Monument.' 4 The district court granted a summary judgment motion,
holding that the challenged conduct involved protected policy
judgments.1
5
The plaintiff attempted to show that his cause of action was permis-
sible under the first Berkovitz requirement. The Park Service had de-
cided to construct and mark the trail on which he was injured, and had
also produced a Management Plan calling for improvements to the trail
to increase safety. The plaintiff argued that implementing these two
Park Service actions did not call for the exercise of any discretion.' 6
The court'of appeals rejected this contention, stating that the Park Ser-
vice actions were general in nature, and included no time limits. Neces-
sarily, park personnel would have to use individual judgment in
identifying portions of the trail that were hazardous, and in deciding
what types of improvements were necessary.'
7
Under the second Berkovitz requirement, the plaintiff asserted that
failing to warn hikers of the trail's dangers did not implicate any social,
economic or political policy judgments.18 That argument was plausible,
in light of earlier Tenth Circuit cases with similar facts where the FTCA
actions were permitted to be maintained for injuries allegedly caused by
failures to warn of thermal pools 19 or dangerous swimming condi-
tions.20 The court of appeals held, however, that the absence of signs in
the current case was part of an overall policy decision to maintain the
12. Id. at 1274.
13. Id. at 1275.
14. The plaintiff alleged negligent operation, ownership, maintenance, control, in-
spection or failure of inspection, and management. Zumwalt, 928 F.2d at 952.
15. Id. at 951-52.
16. Id. at 953-54.
17. Id. at 954.
18. Id. at 955 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 881 F.2d 895, 898 (10th Cir. 1989)).
19. Smith V. United States, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976).
20. Boyd v. United States, 881 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1989).
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trail in a wilderness state.2 1
The court supported that conclusion by referring to Park Service
Management Policies stating that wilderness areas will be administered
"in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoy-
ment as wilderness .. -22 The court quoted but did not specifically
refer to another portion of those Policies stating that " '[s]igns and
markers may be provided only where they are necessary for visitor
safety, management, or resource protection.' ",23 In Smith v. United
States24, there was testimony by a ranger that warnings were not given
because of a decision that they were not necessary, rather than because
of an overall plan to avoid use of warning signs.2 5 In Boyd v. United
States,2 6 there was no showing that omission of warnings to snorklers
and swimmers was based on any public policy considerations. The court
of appeals summarized the basis for distinguishing the earlier cases by
stating that "[t]he decision to leave the Trail in its wild state, whether
explicit or implicit, related directly to the overall scheme set out in the
Management Policies." 27 It held that decisions such as those challenged
by the plaintiff, which are components of an overall policy decision, are
protected by the discretionary function exception.
In Johnson,28 the plaintiff's decedent became separated from three
companions while climbing a mountain in Grand Teton National Park.
His companions completed the descent and then reported to rangers
that the decedent was overdue. Because of confusion over the identities
of various climbers, a decision to search for the decedent was delayed.
When the rangers finally undertook a helicopter search, they found the
decedent's body in about twenty minutes. He had apparently died from
hypothermia about six hours after rangers had first been notified that he
was missing. Allegedly, a helicopter search instituted when rangers
were first informed of the possible danger would have saved the dece-
dent's life. The district court granted summary judgment to the govern-
ment. On appeal, the court affirmed the summary judgment ruling
under the discretionary function exception.
The plaintiff sought to challenge Park Service decisions about the
warnings given to visitors concerning the hazards of mountain climbing,
as well as decisions not to require use of safety equipment and not to
"clear" the mountain at the end of each day. Those decisions were dis-
cretionary under the first part of the Berkovitz analysis, the court held,
because they were not prescribed by specific statutes or regulations. 29
With regard to the second portion of the Berkovitz analysis, the court
21. Zumwalt, 928 F.2d at 955.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 953-54 n. 3.
24. 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976).
25. Id. at 877 n. 5.
26. 881 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1989).
27. Id. at 955.
28. 949 F.2d 332, 334-35 (10th Cir. 1991).
29. Id. at 336-37.
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held that the decisions involve public policy considerations, and are thus
the type of discretionary conduct that is meant to be insulated from judi-
cial scrutiny under the FTCA. The court referred to testimony describ-
ing the implicated policies, including a policy of recognizing that "many
Park visitors value backcountry climbing as one of the few experiences
free from government regulation or interference."
30
The plaintiff also alleged that rangers had responded negligently to
information that a climber was in danger. The court held that the Park
Service decisions about the timing of a rescue effort were also protected
from suit. The Service is not controlled by a specific statute or regula-
tion, so it passed the first prong of Berkovitz. To establish that they also
satisfy the "policy considerations" requirement, the court reviewed the
factors involved in rangers' decisions of this type. Those factors in-
clude: (1) limited human and economic resources; (2) visitors apprecia-
tion of the dangers of climbing and value "the individual freedom of a
backcountry experience;"''s and (3) variation in the risks inherent in a
climber's being overdue caused by terrain, the number of climbers, the
weather and the presence or absence of a leader at the scene. The court
concluded that the rangers' decisions are "grounded in social and eco-
nomic policy" 3 2 because they involve the balancing of these various fac-
tors. On that basis, application of the FTCA was properly prohibited.
In Redmon, wrongful death plaintiffs alleged that the decedent's
death in an airplane crash was caused by an FAA employee's negligent
change in the decedent's pilot certification. The district court dismissed
the claim on the basis of the discretionary function exception. That re-
sult was affirmed by the court of appeals.3 3 The employee changed the
decedent's certificate to conform to regulations issued by the FAA; the
agency had ruled that pilots who were rated for instrument flying (flying
by instruments where visibility is too low for ordinary piloting) on sin-
gle-engine aircraft could carry that rating over to multi-engine aircraft
without a practical flight test. That decision and a related grace-period
decision "fit squarely" within the agency's discretion to act to assure
safety in air commerce and to make decisions about use of its limited
resources to promote the goal of air safety.3 4
The Redmon plaintiffs also alleged that an FAA inspector violated
"specific mandatory" regulations when he failed to investigate and take
enforcement actions against the decedent. 35 That characterization of
their cause of action was motivated by Berkovitz, since failure to follow
prescribed requirements is conduct that is outside the protection of the
discretionary function exception. The court of appeals quoted portions
30. Id. at 337.
31. Id. at 339.
32. Id.
33. Redmon, 934 F.2d at 1157 (remand required because the district court had dis-
missed on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the proper'treatment was sum-
mary judgment for the government).
34. Id. at 1156.
35. Id.
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of the statute and regulations, however, and characterized them as hav-
ing a "discretionary tone,"'3 6 and therefore different from the nondiscre-
tionary licensing and approval provisions at stake in Berkovitz. The
statute permits the Secretary of Transportation to reexamine any certi-
fied airman and amend, modify, suspend or revoke the airman's certifi-
cate if "safety in air commerce or air transportation and the public
interest requires. . .. ,"37 The corresponding regulations are similar in
stating that investigation of violation reports is discretionary.5 8 The
court stated that decisions concerning specific enforcement actions in-
herently involve a balancing of the goal of air safety and the "reality of
finite agency resources ... ",9
While Redmon seems clearly to be the type of case that the Congress
intended to cover by the discretionary function exception, the two Park
Service cases, Zumwalt and Johnson, present closer questions. To exag-
gerate the positions taken by the court of appeals in those cases, it could
be argued that they hold that park rangers can give inadequate consider-
ation to requests for help because resources are limited, and that park
administrators can ignore their own conclusions that better signs are
needed on a trail because questions of social policy are involved in con-
sidering whether to act reasonably in response to a request for rescue or
in following an agency's general plan for increasing safety on trails.
In its most recent opinion on this subject, the Supreme Court pro-
vided an example of conduct by a government employee that involves
discretion, but is not shielded by the discretionary function exception: if
a government official "drove an automobile on a mission connected with
his official duties and negligently collided with another car, the excep-
tion would not apply." 40 For the court of appeals, the way a park worker
responds to a rescue request is significantly different from the way that
same worker might respond, while driving, through heavy traffic making
decisions about whether to pass or stay in a lane. Berkovitz may require
that result, but the court of appeals seems highly willing to find social
policy implications (and thus characterize behavior as discretionary) in
conduct as mundane as failing to post signs that decision-makers have
described as needed or failing to respond to a claimed need for rescue.
That stance towards applying the teachings of the Berkovitz case strongly
contradicts claims of pro-plaintiff litigation trends.
Two decisions on procedural points also represent positions that
contradict the "claims crisis" image of compensation-oriented courts
routinely favoring plaintiffs. In Bradley v. United States,4 1 the plaintiff
specified his injury, in the required presentation of his claim to the rele-
36. Redmon, 934 F.2d at 1157.
37. 14 U.S.C. app. § 1429(a) (1988).
38. 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.3 and 13.5 (1991).
39. Redmon, 934 F.2d at 1154 (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797,
820 (1984)).
40. United States v. Gaubert, I11 S. Ct. 1267, 1275 n. 7 (1991).
41. 951 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1991).
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vant agency, as" 'in excess of $100,000.' ,42 The court of appeals held
that this claim was not definite enough to satisfy the statute's require-
ment of a "claim for money damages in a sum certain."'43 That failure
could be relied upon by the United States as a complete defense. The
court stated: "[w]e sympathize with Plaintiff's plight and recognize the
harsh result of our decision .... -144 But despite that empathy, the deci-
sion represents a point of view that narrows, rather than broadens,
plaintiffs' access to redress. On parallel facts, the Fifth Circuit reached
the opposite result, holding that a similar statement regarding the
amount of a claim complied with the government's need for information
used to determine its treatment of a plaintiff's claim.45
On another procedural issue, in Aldrich Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States,4 6 the Tenth Circuit consolidated its authority by abrogating its
practice of applying the "local judge" rule to give deference to interpre-
tations of state law by district court judges in FTCA cases. It reached
that result by analogy to Salve Regina College v. Russell,47 that dealt with
the issue in the context of diversity cases.4 8 If appellate courts are more
sensitive to broad policy problems than trial courts may be, then de-
creasing deference to trial court rulings may moderate the effect of any
pro-plaintiff trends influencing litigation at the trial level.
In one FTCA case, a district court's pro-defendant ruling was re-
versed. In Bird v. United States,49 the wrongful death plaintiff sought
damages for the death of his wife at a hospital operated by the United
States. The plaintiff claimed that the death was caused by negligence
on the part of a certified nurse anesthetist. The district court denied
recovery, finding that the nurse was an independent contractor and not
an employee of the United States.50 Closely reviewing the facts found
by the district court, the court of appeals stressed that the power to su-
pervise and control the nurse was vested in the hospital. It noted:
[s]ome concepts and relationships are inherently implausible-
a two-year old yearling, a white blackbird.., a certified regis-
tered nurse anesthetist serving in a hospital in the circum-
stances of this case under the license, supervision and control
of a surgeon or physician anesthesiologist as an integral part of
a government operating team, but at the same time as an in-
dependent contractor.5 1
Therefore, the court placed responsibility for the nurse's negligence on
the United States, and remanded the case.
42. Id. at 270.
43. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1991).
44. Bradley, 951 F.2d at 271.
45. Martinez v. United States, 728 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1984).
46. 938 F.2d 1134 (10th Cir. 1991).
47. 111 S.Ct. 1217 (1991).
48. In applying that result to FTCA cases, the court relied, in part, on David Good-
night, Chaos on AppeaL" The Tenth Circuit's LocalJudge Rule, 67 DENv. U. L. REv. 515 (1990).
49. 949 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1991).
50. Id. at 1080.
51. Id. at 1088.
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If our legal system were truly experiencing a pro-plaintiff revolu-
tion, one would expect the Tenth Circuit to interpret the FTCA excep-
tions narrowly, permitting the greatest number of victims of accidental
injuries to sue the government. Redmon, Zumwalt and Johnson show no
tendency in that direction. Neither is the result in Bradley, where "excess
of $100,000" was not a clear enough statement of the plaintiff's claim,
evidence of a pro-compensation trend. Furthermore, the abrogation of
the local judge rule in Aldrich Enterprises may be difficult to classify as
favoring either plaintiffs or defendants in general, but since it effects a
small reinforcement of the appellate court power, it may have a slightly
conservative impact. Only Bird is balanced against these decisions, re-
versing a government victory where the facts of the wrongdoer's em-
ployment were overwhelmingly clear to the appellate court.
Additional Federal Substantive Law. The court of appeals clarified re-
quirements of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act,
sometimes referred to as COBRA. 52 Congress intended the statute to
prevent private hospitals from avoiding treatment of low income and
indigent patients. It covers any hospital that operates an emergency de-
partment and receives Medicare payments, and provides that when a
person presents himself for examination and treatment of a medical
condition, the hospital must give a screening examination to determine
whether an emergency medical condition exists. The hospital may not,
in general, transfer the person out of the hospital until his emergency
medical condition is stabilized.
In Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hospital Founders Association,53 the jury
charges covered situations where a hospital complies with or violates
both of the COBRA requirements noted above, but were unclear as to
the hospital's liability if it failed to comply with any one of the two re-
quirements. Special interrogatories showed that the jury believed that
the hospital had complied with all of the statutory requirements, so any
error in the instructions was harmless.54 Nonetheless, the court of ap-
peals said that instructions should state that failure to comply with either
requirement subjects a hospital to liability.55
Furthermore, the court stated that this liability is strict, and does
not require a showing of negligence. A portion of the statute provides
for civil fines on proof that a hospital or its agent has negligently vio-
lated the statute, but the section establishing civil enforcement by indi-
viduals omits the word "negligently." This reflects a strict liability
standard.
56
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988). The acronym "COBRA" comes from Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 Pub. L. No. 99-272 § 9121, 100 Stat. 82, 184-
671.
53. 950 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1991).
54. Id. at 684.
55. Id. at 680.
56. Id. at 680-81. See also Stevison v. Enid Health Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 710, 713 (10th
Cir. 1990)(language stating that hospital "must" provide medical screening is mandatory
and imposes strict liability).
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Federal Procedure and Evidence Issues. One of the Tenth Circuit's 1991
torts cases exemplifies current tort law controversies. In Mason v. Texaco,
Inc.,57 the defendant failed to provide adequate warnings of the health
risks associated with use of its product, and the plaintiff's decedent, al-
legedly because of the defendant's failure, contracted cancer and died.
Liability for wrongful death was established and damages were set at $9
million in actual damages and $25 million in punitive damages. 58 The
court of appeals reduced the punitive damages by half, deciding that
although the award was excessive it was not the result of tainted jury
deliberations. 5 9 Another aspect of the case is highly significant. The
victim filed suit in 1978, and died in 1979. It was not until the end of
1991 that the court of appeals affirmed thejudgment against the defend-
ant. In broad outline, this case shows a major flaw of the torts system in
operation: it delivers a large sum of money to deserving plaintiffs, but
makes them wait a very long time to get it. Because the compensatory
damages were delayed so long, a kind of under-compensation has oc-
curred, despite the vast amount ultimately awarded.
Significantly, the Mason court analyzed the punitive damages award
by stating that "[i]t is well settled that mere excessiveness in the amount
of an award may be cured by a remittitur, whereas excessiveness which
results from jury passion and prejudice may not be so cured. In that
case, a new trial is required."'60 The appellate court agreed with the trial
court's rejection of the claim that the punitive damages award was the
product of passion, prejudice or bias. Detailing the district court's re-
view of relevant factors that could have supported the jury's verdict, the
appellate court supported its view against a finding of impermissible in-
fluence in regard to the amount of the award. Nevertheless, the court
used its remittitur power by reference to an earlier trial of the same case
in which the plaintiff sought only $8 million in punitive damages and did
not appeal the jury finding that no punitive damages were appropriate.
The court of appeals apparently relied upon the inconsistency be-
tween the jury's verdicts in the first and second trials of the as its basis
for ordering the remittitur. This may contradict the court's own quota-
tion from the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy in Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,6 1 asserting that variation injury verdicts is a
necessary consequence of the use ofjuries in single cases as opposed to
the creation of a permanent body of decision makers. Following the
logic of Justice Kennedy, the disparate results by the two juries on the
question of punitive damages could have been considered an acceptable
consequence of our jury trial system. 6 2 Instead of reaching that conclu-
sion, the court of appeals chose to moderate the size of the judgment.
Some have cited the courts' willingness to intervene this way as the best
57. 948 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).
58. Id. at 1548-550.
59. Id. at 1561.
60. Id.
61. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
62. Mason, 948 F.2d at 1559.
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approach to limiting occasional extraordinarily large verdicts, in con-
trast to the imposition of statutory limits on the size of verdicts. Thus
the Tenth Circuit's action may be characterized as neither pro-plaintiff
nor pro-defendant, but rather as a moderate response to the problems
posed by unusually large punitive damage awards.
In several cases, the court of appeals took the straight-forward posi-
tion that the Federal Rules of Evidence on expert testimony63 incorpo-
rate only minimal restrictions on the introduction of expert testimony.
In torts litigation, availability of expert witnesses may have crucial effects
on outcomes, and defendants will typically contend that experts offered
by plaintiffs do not have expertise adequately focussed on the topics in
dispute. The Tenth Circuit's opinions give full effect to the Congres-
sional choice embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence, and reject a
narrower approach that might have been available to trial judges under
earlier standards.
Illustrative of the appellate court's treatment of expert witness qual-
ification is its decision in Wheeler v. John Deere Co.,64 upholding the trial
court's admission of expert testimony. The trial court permitted a plain-
tiff's expert in a products liability case to testify that farm machinery,
manufactured by the defendant, was dangerous beyond the expectation
of the ordinary user. The witness was a mechanical engineer with exper-
tise in design of farm equipment; the court of appeals stated that inher-
ent in his field of work is "anticipation of how such equipment will be
perceived and used by consumers."'6 5 On that basis, it held that the tes-
timony was properly admitted.
6 6
State Law Decisions. The Tenth Circuit's decisions involving the ap-
plication of state law cover an array of issues that show both pro-plaintiff
and pro-defendant resolutions. These decisions are partly controlled by
state precedents and partly adopted within the narrow ambit for the
court's own interpretation of state law issues.
For example, an Indiana statute of repose for product-related inju-
ries was challenged as violative of the United States Constitution, in Al-
exander v. Beech Aircraft Corp.6 7 In line with decisions from the Seventh
Circuit, the Tenth Circuit rejected the challenge, stating that an unac-
crued cause of action is not a property right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. A limitation on product-related causes of action can there-
fore legitimately be imposed by a statute of repose that is related to leg-
islative purposes such as "avoiding the risks and cost of litigation to
manufacturers after a lengthy passage of time."
6 8
In a suit applying Wyoming law, the court of appeals applied the
63. Fed. R. Evid. 702 & 703.
64. 935 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1991).
65. Id. at 1100.
66. For a discussion of other evidence cases see Sheila Hyatt, Evidence Survey 69 DENy.
L. REv. (Aug. 1992).
67. 952 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir. 1991)(a Kansas district court applied Indiana law).
68. Id. at 1225.
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rescue doctrine in an action brought by the mother of a child. 69 The
child was erroneously given an overdose of medicine by hospital person-
nel. As the mother rushed to the hospital to be with the child, she was
injured in an auto accident. She sought damages for her injuries from
the hospital. The court of appeals held that, under the facts most
favorable to the plaintiff, the mother could not have had a reasonable
belief that a rescue was necessary since she knew that the hospital, where
the improper treatment had occurred, was caring for her child. For that
reason, the district court had properly granted summary judgment to
the defendant hospital.
70
The appellate court rejected the plaintiff's claim that Wyoming's
adoption of comparative negligence should be treated as modifying the
rescue doctrine's requirement that the plaintiff have had a reasonable
belief that rescue was needed. The court took this position with only a
brief reference to Wyoming's requirement of a "reasonable undertak-
ing" of a rescue.7 1 A comparative negligencejurisdiction may, however,
reasonably take the opposite view. For example, a recent decision of the
Michigan Supreme Court holds that a rescuer's own subjective belief
that rescue is needed can justify use of the rescue doctrine, so long as
that belief is reasonable, even if the intended object of the rescue is actu-
ally safe at the time the rescue is attempted.72
In product-related injury cases, plaintiffs sometimes have difficultly
establishing the precise manner in which injury occurred. In cases ap-
plying Kansas and Oklahoma law, the Tenth Circuit has held that cir-
cumstantial evidence can be adequate proof that a power tool's design
contributed to a victim's injury, 73 and that a gas pipeline was inade-
quately constructed, inspected or maintained.' 4 Requiring direct evi-
dence of how a power tool severed a victim's fingers or of the exact
connection between an explosion and a gas supply line maintained by a
utility would provide complete protection for the product sellers from
liability for injuries that were most likely caused by their products. Most
states clearly reject that view. Likewise, the court of appeals applied
Kansas and Oklahoma precedents to avoid this result.
In other state law cases, the court of appeals clarified two issues in
Colorado law. In the first, Simon v. Wisconsin Marine Inc.,T5 the issue was
whether the Colorado statute of limitations for personal injury actions
included the anniversary day of the injury. The court of appeals con-
cluded that a suit filed on the second anniversary of the injury was
timely, holding that a Colorado Supreme Court decision had reached
69. Dinsmore v. Board of Trustees of the Memorial Hosp., 936 F.2d 505 (10th Cir.
1991).
70. Id. at 507-08.
71. Id. at 507.
72. Solomon v. Shuell, 457 N.W.2d 669 (Mich. 1990).
73. Werth v. Makita Electric Works, Ltd., 950 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1991).
74. Goodwin v. Enserch Corp., 949 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1991).
75. 947 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1991).
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that result by implication.76 In.a second suit, involving a defective onion
seed,7 7 the defect caused large losses to a commercial farmer. The
court of appeals held that Colorado law permits exemplary damages in
breach of contract cases, where negligence, such as mislabeling by a
seed distributor, produces foreseeable injury.78 This ruling permitted
the plaintiffs to recover a judgment that included $1.2 million for emo-
tional distress and exemplary damages.
Conclusion. Surveying one year's work of the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals shows that the tort system continues to operate with a variety of
doctrines that are far from one-sided. The FTCA cases show full com-
pliance with the United States Supreme Court's restrictive interpreta-
tions of the discretionary function exception. On the other hand, the
court has applied the Federal Rules of Evidence as generously as any
torts plaintiff could wish. On state law issues, the court affirmed the
constitutionality of a pro-defendant statute of repose and adopted a pro-
defendant interpretation of Wyoming's rescue doctrine. It also, how-
ever, approved applications of state law that permit personal injury
plaintiffs to recover with only circumstantial evidence of the link be-
tween defendants' conduct and their injuries. Despite the claim that the
torts system has suffered a qualitative change in the pro-plaintiff direc-
tion, the 1991 pattern of litigation in the Tenth Circuit resembles pat-
terns from previous years.
76. See Dillingham v. Greeley Publishing Co., 701 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1985).
77. Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1991).
78. Id. at 647.
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